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The aim of this paper is to give an account of Descartes’ mathematical achievements in 1628–1629 using, as
far as is possible, only contemporary documents, and in particular Beeckman’s Journal for October 1628. In the
first part of the paper, I study the content of these documents, bringing to light the mathematical weaknesses
they display. In the second part, I argue for the significance of these documents by comparing them with other
independent sources, such as Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Finally, I outline the main consequences
of this study for understanding the mathematical development of Descartes before and after 1629.
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What Descartes knew in 1628 4291. Introduction
The starting point of this paper is a puzzling testimony given in his Journal1 by Isaac
Beeckman, a Dutch scholar whom Descartes met in 1618 and considered “the promoter
of his studies” [AT I, 161]. In October 1628, the French philosopher came to Dordrecht
to visit his old friend, for whom he had written the Compendium musicae ten years before
and to whom he presented his project of reforming all sciences, not long before leaving Hol-
land in 1619. He described to Beeckman the results of his past nine years of study, especially
in mathematics, during which, he said “he had made as much progress as was possible for a
human mind” [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 94, fol. 333r]. As proof, he gave Beeckman
a specimen of a “general algebra.” He also promised to send a treatise on algebra, by which
he claimed one could bring geometry to perfection and, more than that, all human knowl-
edge [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 95, fol. 333r]. But when one looks at the specimen
that was transcribed by Beeckman under the title Algebrae Des Cartes specimen quoddam
and which I will study in Section 2.3, one is struck by its very poor and apparently confused
mathematical content.
The discovery of these documents at the beginning of the 20th century has not discour-
aged commentators from proposing many reconstructions of Descartes’ philosophical and
mathematical development in which he is supposed to have reached a high level of
technique before 1628, sometimes as early as 1619–1620. What I intend in this article is a
bit of deflationist history. As a methodological exercise, I shall stick as far as possible to
the texts to see if it is possible to build a coherent interpretation of them without making
assumptions for which we have no evidence. Hence my first task will be to provide reasons
we might have for taking Beeckman’s testimony seriously, and thus consider that in 1628
Descartes was not mathematically well advanced in the topics that he discussed with his
friend. This implies the necessity of looking for confirmation in other sources, and this is
what I shall do in the second part of the paper. The main document in this regard is the
Regulae ad directionem ingenii,2 in which Descartes presented a schematism (i.e., a spatial
representation of algebraic operations) very close to that presented to Beeckman in 1628,
and which seems to have been written, at least in part, during the same period.3 As I will1 The manuscript of Beeckman’s Journal was recovered by Cornelis de Waard in the Provincial
library of Zeeland in 1905, so Charles Adam could insert the passages related to Descartes in
Volume X of Les Oeuvres de Descartes (1908), which he launched with Paul Tannery before the
death of the latter in 1904. See [Descartes, 1964–1974, pp. 17–78, 151–169 and 331–348. From now
on, AT]. De Waard gave an edition of it in four volumes [Beeckman, 1939–1953].
2 The Rules for the direction of the mind is an unfinished methodological treatise, which was not
published and does not contain a clear indication of date [AT X, 359–469, from now on Regulae].
It was written in Latin and was left by Descartes in his papers at his death. It consists of a series
of Rules, of which only the first 21 are extant, Rules XIX–XXI subsisting only through their
planned titles. The original manuscript is now lost and all existing editions were made from copies.
The first one was a translation in Dutch in 1684, followed by a Latin edition published in Renati
Descartes Opuscula posthuma [Descartes, 1701]. For the tormented history of the treatise, see
[Descartes, 1966].
3 One of the main arguments is the fact that Descartes mentions, in Rule VIII, the study of the
“anaclastic curve” and concludes, “Even though the anaclastic has been the object of much fruitless
430 D. Rabouintry to show, the mathematical weaknesses in these two projects are strikingly similar. More
than that, these weaknesses, which seem incompatible with the techniques employed in
La Géométrie, are fully compatible with those employed in an early Cartesian treatise, often
forgotten by commentators: The Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis.4
This strategy also requires giving a new account of the relationship between the pas-
sages in Beeckman’s Journal of October 1628 and the text Descartes sent Beeckman a
few months later and which Descartes described as his “most outstanding discovery”:
the “construction” of the third and fourth degree equation by the intersection of a para-
bola and a circle — a technique much more sophisticated than anything that could be
expected from the “sample” presented in 1628.5 I emphasize that these various documents
were presented separately to Beeckman, as were the other works done on curves (conic
sections), which were produced at that time by Descartes in the context of optics and
through purely geometrical means. There is no question of studying curves through alge-
braic techniques in the documents produced in 1628–1629, and the program presented
to Beeckman is not that of a new classification of curves. How are we to understand this
fact if this classification of curves is supposed to have been at the core of Descartes’ pro-
gram since 1619?
My claim is that one should resist the temptation of projecting onto this set of docu-
ments the unified view permitted by the “geometrical calculus” presented in 1637 in
La Géométrie.6 In fact, this methodological requisite seems of importance if one wants to
understand the breakthrough leading to the very idea of this “calcul géométrique,” that
is, how what were separated in 1628–1629 (the “general algebra,” the “construction” of
equations, and the study of curves) came to be gathered in a unified treatment. As I will
try to show, it is not sufficient to paste together the different attempts presented in 1628
to regain a unified treatment, and there were deep reasons for these elements to remain
separated at that time.research in the past, I can see nothing to prevent anyone who uses our method exactly from
gaining a clear knowledge of it” [AT X, 395; transl. Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 29; on this example,
see below Note 10]. Since Beeckman, explicitly answering a question from Descartes, found a
demonstration that the hyperbola satisfies the condition and, after receiving Descartes’ approba-
tion, transcribed it in a page of his Journal dated 1 February 1629, this would mean that the
passage could plausibly have been written between 1626 (when Descartes started his research on
this topic) and 1629.
4 The Progymnasta de solidorum elementis is a treatise on solid geometry and polyhedral numbers
that exists now only in a (presumably partial) copy with no clear indication of date. It was
reproduced in the Adam–Tannery edition [AT X, pp. 257–277]. Two more up-to-date editions are
available, one with English translation [Descartes, 1982] and the other with French translation
[Descartes, 1987].
5 Fol. 339v, dated 1 February 1629. At the end of the text, Beeckman writes: Hanc inventionem tanti
facit D. des Chartes, ut fateatur se nihil unquam praestantius invenisse, imo a nemine unquam
praestantius quid inventum [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. IV, pp. 138–139].
6 See for instance [Israel, 1998]. To avoid anachronistic designations such as “analytical geometry”
or “algebraic geometry,” I shall use Descartes own terminology in La Géométrie: “Mais, parce que
j’espère que dorénavant ceux qui auront l’adresse de se servir du calcul géométrique ici proposé, ne
trouveront pas assez de quoi s’arrêter touchant les problèmes plans ou solides, je crois qu’il est à
propos que je les invite à d’autres recherches, où ils ne manqueront jamais d’exercice” [AT VI, 390].
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2.1. Situating the Cartesian program in 1628
According to Beeckman’s Journal, in 1628 “Louis René Descartes du Perron” went first
to Middleburg (the town where Descartes, in May 1619, had last sent letters to him) in
order to visit him. But Beeckman was no longer in Middleburg and it was not until
8 October, 1628 that Descartes finally met his friend again in Dordrecht [Beeckman,
1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 95, fol. 333r]. As he would reiterate nine years later,7 the Frenchman
explained to his friend that he had worked a lot in arithmetic and geometry since their last
exchange and made such great advances in these sciences that he had nothing more to
expect from them (se in arithmeticis and geometricis nihil amplius optare).8 To make his pro-
gress clear, he presented some “samples” of his work (cujus rei non obscura mihi specimina
reddidit) and promised to send later a treatise of Algebra completed in Paris.
Even if Descartes did say that the treatise on algebra was complete, it was not yet ready
for publication because, as he explained, he thought of it as a basis for a more ambitious
project intended to embrace all human knowledge.9 This ambitious project was, in fact,
the main reason that Descartes gave for his visit. What he expected from Beeckman was
to engage in this program, pursuing their former fruitful collaboration: “traveling through
Germany, France and Italy, he had not found anybody else, he says, with whom he could
discuss according to his heart (secundum animi) and from whom he could hope for aid in his
researches”.10 This development is transcribed by Beeckman in his journal under the title7 In 1637 Descartes published the “Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison et
chercher la vérité dans les sciences” as an introduction to a collection of “Essais de la Méthode”
presenting his major scientific achievements and consisting of La Dioptrique, Les Météores and
La Géométrie [AT VI].
8 Compare with Discours de la méthode, AT VI, 20–21. Just after recalling the results he had
obtained following the rules of his method, Descartes also explains in the Discours in what sense this
could be seen as “perfect knowledge”: “In this I might perhaps appear to you to be very vain if you
did not remember that having but one truth to discover in respect to each matter, whoever succeeds
in finding it knows in its regard as much as can be known” [Descartes, 2003, p. 94].
9 Paulo post Parisiis suam Algebram, quam perfectam dicit, quâque ad Geometriae scientiam
pervenit, imo qua ad omnem cognitionem humanam pervenire potest, propediem ad me missurus
[Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 95].
10 Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 95. This is not mere courtesy, as Descartes did indeed ask
Beeckman for help in the resolution of an important problem in optics: the proof of the fact that the
hyperbola is an anaclastic curve. “The line called the ‘anaclastic’ in optics,” to repeat Descartes’ own
description in the Regulae, is “the line from which parallel rays are so refracted that they intersect at
a single point” [AT X, 393–394; transl. Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 28–29]. Immediately after the sample
of algebra, Beeckman also transcribed in his Journal other Cartesian works concerning optics and
conic sections. The first fragment concerns the angle of refraction (Angulus refractionis Des Cartes
exploratus fol. 333v) and contains the famous “law of sines.” The second concerns “burning lenses,”
which Descartes discovered using the fact that the hyperbola is an anaclastic curve (Quod attinet ad
inventionem hyperbolicae sectionis ejus generis, per quam omnes radii in idem punctum refringantur,
quod dictus DES CHARTES dicit se fecisse fol. 334r). This last fact was apparently not proved by
Descartes, who asked Beeckman if he could demonstrate it. This is testified by a fragment dated
1 February 1629, which begins with these words: “Hanc de hyperbola propositionem D. des Chartes
indemonstratam reliquerat, ac me rogavit ut ejus demonstrationem quaererem, quam cum invenissem,
gravisus est ac genuinam esse judicavit” [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, pp. 109–110, fol. 338v].
432 D. RabouinHistoria Des Cartes ejusque mecum necessitudo and is followed by a general commentary,
entitled docti cur pauci, making reference to the fact that there were so few learned men
at the time — a phrase which reminds us of the famous physico-mathematici paucissimi
written by the same Beeckman when he first met Descartes in 1618 [Beeckman, 1939–
1953, Vol. I, p. 244, fol. 100v].
The Algebra is hence presented in the context of a more ambitious project, which is very
close to the one presented in the Regulae, in which Descartes warns,11 A
falsit
data
12 “P
fondeI would not value these Rules so highly if they were good only for solving those pointless
problems with which arithmeticians and geometers are inclined to while away their time,
for in that case all I could credit myself with achieving would be to dabble in trifles with
greater subtlety than they. I shall have much to say below about figures and numbers, for
no other disciplines can yield illustrations as evident and certain as these. But if one
attends closely to my meaning, one will readily see that ordinary mathematics is far from
my mind here, that it is quite another discipline I am expounding, and that these illustra-
tions are more its outer garments than its inner parts. This discipline should contain the
primary rudiments of human reason and extend to the discovery of truths in any field
whatever. Frankly speaking, I am convinced that it is a more powerful instrument of
knowledge than any other with which human beings are endowed, as it is the source
of all the rest. [Rule IV, AT X, 373–374; transl. Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 17]The whole treatise, according to a general plan exposed in Rule XII, was supposed to con-
tain a description of a general method to solve any question and was intended to consist of
three parts of twelve rules each, dealing respectively with “simple propositions,” “perfect
questions,” and “imperfect questions.”11 In introducing the second part, Descartes gives a
warning similar to that in Rule IV: “This part of our method was designed not just for the sake
of mathematical problems; our intention was, rather, that the mathematical problems should
be studied almost exclusively for the sake of the excellent practice which they give us in the
method.” [Rule XIV, AT X, 442; transl. Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 59: my emphasis.]
All these documents converge toward the idea that Descartes left France with a project that
was supposed to go much further than mathematics, or even “physico-mathematics,” and
touch ad omnem cognitionem humanam. In the third part of Discours de la méthode (1637),
he claims to have spent nine years after 1619 practicing “in the solution of mathematical prob-
lems according to the Method, or the solution of other problems which though pertaining to
other sciences, I was able to make almost similar to those of mathematics” [AT VI, 30]. But
Descartes then adds a very important comment: this occurred, he says, before he had taken
“any definite part in regard to the difficulties as to which the learned are in the habit of dis-
puting, or had commenced to seek the foundation of any philosophy more certain than the
vulgar” [AT VI, 30]. As regard these “foundations,” the correspondence of 1629–1630 makes
it clear that they were related to his later investigations in physics.
In a letter of October 1629 to Mersenne, Descartes states indeed, just after mentioning
his actual project of a small treatise of physics (on meteors), that he has “now taken a stand
on all the foundations of philosophy.”12 In a famous letter of 15 April 1630, he answers a
theological question from Mersenne by stating,“question” is everything in which a truth can be sought (as opposed to “intuition” in which no
y can occur). A question is “perfect” when everything that is sought can be deduced from the
and “imperfect” if not [AT X, 431].
our la Raréfaction je suis d’accord avec ce Médecin et ai maintenant pris parti touchant tous les
ments de la Philosophie” [AT I, 25: my emphasis].
13 “M
partic
établ
14 “P
mais
prend
15 In
1630,
“I ha
learn
modi
see [G
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employ it principally in the endeavour to know him and to know themselves. That is the
task with which I began my studies; and I can say that I would not have been able to dis-
cover the foundations of physics if I had not looked for them along that road. It is the topic
which I have studied more than any other and in which, thank God, I have not altogether
wasted my time. At least I think that I have found how to prove metaphysical truths in a man-
ner which is more evident than the proofs of geometry — in my opinion, that is: I do not know
if I shall be able to convince others of it. During my first nine months in this country I worked
on nothing else. [AT I, 144; Descartes, 1985–1991, III, 22: my emphasis]Hence it is clear that the first nine months that Descartes spent in Holland, in 1629, were
dedicated to these kinds of inquiries (foundations of physics, connected more generally
to the foundations of philosophy and the status of “metaphysical truths”) and that they
led to a decisive change in Descartes’ thought (“une prise de parti,” as he says). The very
fact that the evidence of geometry could be presented in 1629 not as a basis for a reform
of all human knowledge as in 1628, but as inferior to “metaphysical truths,” is a striking
sign of this change. It is in accordance with the famous thesis presented in the correspon-
dence of 1630 with Mersenne concerning the creation of eternal (i.e., mathematical) truths
by God.13 In the letter of 6 May, Descartes emphasizes,Those who have no higher thoughts than these can easily become atheists; and because
they perfectly comprehend mathematical truths and do not perfectly comprehend the
truth of God’s existence, it is no wonder they do not think the former depend on the latter.
But they should rather take the opposite view, that since God is a cause whose power
surpasses the bounds of human understanding, and since the necessity of these truths
does not exceed our knowledge, these truths are therefore something less than, and sub-
ject to, the incomprehensible power of God. [To Mersenne, AT I, 150; transl. Descartes,
1985–1991, III, 25: my emphasis]Moreover, Descartes explains that he is no longer interested in mathematics14 and mentions
some treatises begun in Paris that he left unfinished because he realized that they were
dependent on other important issues that he had to deal with first [AT I, 138].
One should be careful not to conflate these different steps: a first project, presented to
Beeckman at the end of 1628, was already supposed to lead to a more general program
concerning “all human knowledge,” but it did not imply research on the “foundations of
philosophy”; when Descartes finally took a stand on these foundational issues, at the begin-
ning of 1629, he also clearly changed his mind considering the role of mathematical certainty
and the feasibility of a pure Mathematica-Physica.15ais je ne laisserai pas de toucher en ma Physique plusieurs questions métaphysiques, et
ulièrement celle-ci: Que les vérités mathématiques, lesquelles vous nommez éternelles, ont été
ies de Dieu et en dépendent entièrement, aussi bien que tout le reste des créatures” [AT I, 145].
our des problèmes, je vous en enverrai un million pour proposer aux autres, si vous le désirez;
je suis si las des mathématiques, et en fais maintenant si peu d’état, que je ne saurais plus
re la peine de les soudre moi-même” [AT I, 139].
this regard, one should remember that on the occasion of his brief rupture with Beeckman, in
Descartes criticized very violently what his friend had achieved under this particular program:
ve never learnt anything but idle fancies from your Mathematico-Physica, any more than I have
t anything from the Batrachomyomachia” [AT I, 159; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 27, translation
fied]. On the complex relationship between Descartes and “Physico-mathematics” after 1630,
arber, 2000].
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In the above I have drawn attention to the complexity and the richness of Descartes’
projects during the years 1628–1629. As we have seen, documents exist, be they from this
very period (Beeckman’s Journal, correspondence of 1629–1630) or from later memories
(Discours de la méthode, 1637), testifying that Descartes changed his mind in a significant
way during this time. I now introduce another document often mentioned in the literature
but to my mind less directly connected with our topic: the letter to Beeckman of 26th
March 1619. In it, Descartes announced to his friend, not long before leaving Holland, that
he wanted to launch a “completely new science (scientia penitus nova) by which all questions
in general may be solved that can be proposed about any kind of quantity, continuous as
well as discrete. But each according to its own nature.” He then makes a parallel:16 De
solve
truly
this s
howe
quaesIn arithmetic, for instance, some questions can be solved by rational numbers, some by
surd numbers, and others can be imagined but not solved. For continuous quantity I
hope to prove that, similarly, certain problems can be solved by using only straight or
circular lines, that some problems require other curves for their solution, but still curves
which arise from one single motion and which therefore can be traced by the new com-
passes, which I consider to be no less certain and geometrical than the usual compasses
by which circles are traced; and, finally, that other problems can be solved by curved lines
generated by separate motions not subordinate to one another. [AT X, 157–158; transl.
Bos, 2001, p. 232]16This program, still in infancy and merely analogical, is nonetheless very close to that of
La Géométrie, in which Descartes succeeded in proposing a new classification of geometrical
problems through a classification of curves (relying on the one hand on what he calls
“continuous motion” and on the other hand on algebraic criteria). It is therefore very tempt-
ing to consider that it was the core of “the” Cartesian program from the encounter with
Beeckman in 1618 to the Discours de la méthode and the Essais appended to it in 1637.
The “general algebra” of 1628 could then be considered as a step on this continuous path.
But this kind of continuity seems to me a mere artefact coming from the tendency to go
from the programs to a reconstruction of the practice and not from the actual practice to an
evaluation of the programs. I shall indicate this more clearly in the following pages. But
even staying at the level of declarations, one should emphasize the fact that neither in
the documents given by Beeckman in 1628–1629, nor in the Regulae, is there any mention
of a classification of geometrical problems depending on the classification of curves. How
should we interpret this silence if this is supposed to be at the very core of Descartes’ pro-
gram? The study of curves (in fact, only conic sections) is presented in 1628 separately and
independent of the “general algebra” in the context of works in optics. Moreover, Descartes
does not use algebra in his geometrical analysis of these curves, as transcribed by
Beeckman.
One should also be very cautious when identifying the program of the new discipline
(alia disciplina) announced in the Regulae, in the first part of Rule IV, with the mathesisscartes then continues, “But in due time I hope to prove which questions can or cannot be
d in these several ways: so that hardly anything would remain to be found in geometry. This is a
infinite task, not for a single person. Incredibly ambitious; but through the dark confusion of
cience I have seen some kind of light, and I believe that by its help I can dispel darkness
ver dense.” In the margin, Beeckman writes ars generalis ad omnes quaestiones solvenda
ita.
What Descartes knew in 1628 435universalis mentioned in the second part of the same Rule IV, to ground a hypothetical
proximity with the program of a scientia penitus nova of 1619 (which was supposed to
“solve any question that can be proposed about any kind of quantity, continuous as well
as discrete”). Without entering into the details of this controversial matter,17 I simply recall
what Descartes says in Rule IV. The general context is an investigation into what makes
possible the unity of mathematics — which is indeed the traditional context of reflection
on a possible “general” or “universal” mathematics. On this path, Descartes arrives at
the observation that “the exclusive concern of mathematics is with questions of order or
measure and that it is irrelevant whether the measure in question involves numbers, shapes,
stars, sounds, or any other object whatever.” This leads him to the conclusion “that there
must be a general science (scientia generalis) which explains all the points that can be raised
concerning order and measure irrespective of the subject-matter, and that this science
should be termed not with an unusual name, but with a venerable one, with a well-estab-
lished meaning: mathesis universalis — for it covers everything that entitles these other sci-
ences to be called branches of mathematics” [AT 377, 9–378, 10; Descartes, 1985–1991, I,
19]. The mathesis universalis is therefore presented as a “venerable” discipline with a
“well-established meaning,” not a “completely new science.” A few lines later, Descartes
goes further by stating that everybody not only knows its name, but also its subject matter
(cum nomen ejus omnes norint, et, circa quid versetur... intelligant) and he then wonders why
people do not pay more attention to it [Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 20]. His answer marks the
second (and last!) use of the term in the entire Cartesian corpus:17 Fo
notio
18 Do
mihiAware how slender my powers are, I have resolved in my search for knowledge of things
to adhere unswervingly to a definite order, always starting with the simplest and easiest
things and never going beyond them till there seems to be nothing further which is worth
achieving where they are concerned.18 Up to now, therefore, I have devoted all my ener-
gies to this mathesis universalis, so that I think I shall be able in due course to tackle the
somewhat more advanced sciences, without my efforts being premature. [AT X, 378–379,
6; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 20; transl. modified]Mathesis universalis is therefore a discipline that Descartes studied before he dared to
“tackle the somewhat more advanced sciences,” according to a rule that states that one
should never go beyond the easiest matter “till there seems to be nothing further
which is worth achieving where they are concerned” — the exact contrary of a program
indeed.
My aim here is to draw attention to the fact that there is no reason to merge what seem
to be different projects (the “entirely new science” of 1619, the alia disciplina and the
mathesis universalis of the Regulae, the “general algebra” of 1628) into a single grandiose
view culminating in La Géométrie. In fact, it seems very dubious to ground any hermeneutic
postulate in these texts at all, since they are very allusive and surrounded, as we saw in the
previous section, by many other texts calling into question the continuity of Descartes’ line
of thought. In my opinion, the only way to solve the uncertainties raised by these texts is to
confront them with Descartes’ actual mathematical practice.r a more detailed analysis, see [Rabouin, 2009]. For an overview of the debates around this
n, see [Van de Pitte, 1991] and [Sasaki, 2003, Chap. IV § 3].
nec in istis nihil mihi ulterius optandum superesse videatur: note the proximity with the Is dicebat
se in arithmeticis and geometricis nihil amplius optare.
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I turn now to the Algebrae Des Cartes specimen quoddam (henceforth the Specimen), the
text transcribed by Beeckman, which describes a “general algebra” invented by Descartes
(dicit idem se invenisse Algebram generalem). It relies on a simple geometrical schematism
in which Descartes uses only plane and not solid figures (se non uti corporum figuris, sed
planis duntaxat). This echoes a famous passage of the Regulae in which Descartes explains
how he distanced himself from the traditional interpretation of algebraic powers corre-
sponding to geometrical dimensions, because he understood that they were “nothing but
magnitudes in continued proportion” and, as a consequence, “should never be represented
in the imagination otherwise than as a line or a surface.”19
But, as we shall see, this is not the justification of the notion of dimension given in our
text. Moreover, the justification in the Regulae seems closely tied to what Descartes called
the “number of relations,” which is usually interpreted as connected with the use of an
exponential notation. However, another surprising element of our text is that it still uses
cossic notation.20 The point is not that Descartes uses this notation in and of itself, but that
he does so when introducing what is supposed to be the results of his great advances in
mathematics during the nine preceding years — a very intriguing situation if he was in pos-
session of his new notation at that time. One could of course attribute this “archaism” to
the copyist and make the hypothesis that Beeckman changed Descartes’ notation, but this
would mean, in any case, that Descartes did not emphasize its importance. On the other
hand, one should be very cautious when dealing with Descartes’ notation in the Regulae
and not forget that we possess only late copies of the text, made after the publication of
La Géométrie. Besides, these copies are not coherent with regard to notation. For example,
Rule XVIII does not satisfy the prescription presented in Rule XVI to represent indetermi-
nate quantity by lower case and unknown by uppercase, and uses indifferently a and A to
designate the same quantity. One striking example of the modifications introduced by edi-
tors is in the Excerpta mathematica, a collection of mathematical essays by Descartes that
was published for the first time in the same volume as the Regulae: Renati Descartes Opus-
cula posthuma [Descartes, 1701]. We possess indeed other copies of some texts than the one
given in the Opuscula and one can clearly see in them that x and xx were substituted for19 “We should note also that those proportions which form a continuing sequence are to be
understood in terms of a number of relations; others endeavour to express these proportions in
ordinary algebraic terms by means of many dimensions and figures (. . .). I realized that such
terminology was a source of conceptual confusion and ought to be abandoned completely. For a
given magnitude, even though it is called a cube or the square of the square, should never be
represented in the imagination otherwise than as a line or a surface. So we must note above all that
the root, the square, the cube, etc. are nothing but magnitudes in continued proportion which, it is
always supposed, are preceded by the arbitrary unit mentioned above” [AT X, 456–457; Descartes,
1985–1991, I, 68].
20 “Cossic” comes from Cristopher Rudolff’s book Coss (1525) — which means “unknown” (like
the Italian cosa), the “cossic art” being then the art of dealing with unknowns. This style of algebra
spread in Germany in the 16th century (with authors like Stifel, Faulhaber, or Roth, to whom I shall
come back later). It relied on a notational system in which a symbol was used for every power of the
unknown. The notation transcribed by Beeckman is for the root, for the square, for the cube
and for the square of the square (biquadratum).
Fig. 1. Facsimile of fol. 333 of Beeckman’s autograph. Excerpted from (Beeckman, 1939–1953, III).
What Descartes knew in 1628 437what, in other sources, are cossic symbols.21 One could also note that the Opuscula uses a
cossic sign for addition z in Rule XVI, which was changed in the Adam–Tannery edition. I
shall come back to these issues later because the first surprise occurs before one even
reaches them: in the presentation of the schematism.
As observed above, the schematism used by Descartes in the “general algebra” relied on
two-dimensional figures — the reason invoked being that this representation is easier to
grasp (qui eae facilius mentibus insinuantur). According to Descartes, one should represent
the unit by a small square, the root by a parallelogram composed of as many times the
square unit as needed, and then the square, the cube or the square of the square as rectan-
gles composed of as many times the roots as implied in them. In the diagram drawn by
Beeckman (Fig. 1), a is the square unit, b the root composed of three units, c the square
composed of three times three units, d the cube composed of three times the square
[Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 95, fol. 333r].
Beeckman explains that the representation could be done with simple lines only (per
nudas lineas), each representation being prefixed by the cossic symbol corresponding to it
(Fig. 2).
This could be seen as an anticipation of the famous and groundbreaking opening of
La Géométrie, in which Descartes explained that all the operations of arithmetic could
be interpreted as manipulations on “simple lines.”22 However, certain details of the text pre-21 See [AT X, 298]. Descartes’ discourse about the “number of relations” in the Regulae is perfectly
compatible with other notation, such as Stevin’s (which Descartes could have come across in [Van
Roomen, 1597] — a plausible source for his concept of mathesis universalis; see [Crapulli, 1969]) or
even an adaptation of [Clavius, 1609]. It should indeed be noted that Clavius (like German cossists:
Stifel, Roth, Faulhaber) proposed, when introducing several unknowns, to mark them by capital
letters A, B, C — in the same way as Descartes proposes in Rule XVI [Clavius, 1609, Chap. XV,
p. 72 sq]. Moreover, what we now write as “2y4” would be written by Clavius as “2A”, expressing
the power of an unknown and not an unknown in and of itself (p. 73). Since was referred to, at the
very beginning of Clavius’ treatise, as corresponding to the “exponent” 4, it would have been
very natural (and convenient) to abridge this first notation as “2A4”, or “2A(4)” (Girard’s
notation) if one wanted to avoid ambiguity (since in Clavius’s notation “2A” could refer to “2y4”
or “2yx4”).
22 [AT VI, 371]: “il est à remarquer que, par a2 ou b3 ou semblables, je ne concois ordinairement que
des lignes toutes simples, encore que, pour me servir des noms usités en l’algèbre, je les nomme des
carrés, ou des cubes, etc.” On the role of this “calcul des segments” in Descartes’ Géométrie, see
[Jullien, 1996].
Fig. 2. Representation per nudas lineas. Facsimile of fol. 333 of Beeckman’s autograph excerpted
from (Beeckman, 1939–1953, III).
438 D. Rabouinvent us from jumping to this conclusion. When introducing the representation through unit
squares, Descartes did indeed add a strange ita etiam punctum concipit (“or he conceives of
it in the same way with a point”). After completing the first sequence, Beeckman states
more explicitly: “Or rather, he explains also all of this by lines so that a would represent
a point, b a line, c a square and d a cube. In this manner f represented a cube produced
by the multiplication of the square e by the number of roots.” [Beeckman, 1939–1953,
Vol. III, p. 95, fol. 333r: my emphasis.]
This whole development is very close to Stevin’s ideas. In his Arithmétique, first published
in 1585, and reedited by Albert Girard in 1625, Stevin insisted on the fact that one could
interpret algebraic powers in terms of geometric magnitudes in a continuous proportion
and therefore proposed a very simple geometric schematism, in which there would be no
need to escape from the three dimensions of everyday space. The main difference between
Descartes and Stevin is that Stevin then used a three-dimensional schematism (made of
“beams”, which he calls “plinthides” and “docides”, and not of rectangles).23 See Fig. 3.
But the fact that Descartes also allows us to represent the unit by a geometrical point is
astonishing. It goes directly against what Stevin rightly designated as the great mistake of
his predecessors, who considered the unit in arithmetic as somehow equivalent to the point
in geometry [Stevin, 1955–1966, Vol. II B, p. 498].
The parallel with Stevin leads to another important remark: as in Stevin, the use of the
schematism is here not operative, but foundational,24 that is, there is nothing like a geomet-
rical calculus in our text, and Descartes does not explain how to construct the different
magnitudes through determinate operations. This is not merely an argument from silence
since there seems to be, at first sight, no possibility of grounding a geometric algebra if
the unit is represented as a point and the root as a line.
The apparent confusion of Descartes is reinforced by the following passage, in which he
explains how one should understand the notion of algebraic dimension:23 Th
dunta
24 “D
SteviHe conceives the cube in particular through three dimensions, as do others. But he con-
ceives a biquadratum as if a simple cube made of wood was transformed into a stone
cube: in this manner, indeed, one dimension is added to the whole; but if another dimen-
sion is to be added, he considers a cube made of iron; then of gold, etc. — that which can
be obtained not only with weight but also with colours and with all the other qualities.
Cutting a wooden cube in three squares, he thus conceives that he is cutting a cube made
only of wood, of stone etc. so that the iron cube is transformed into the wooden cube inis could provide a way of interpreting the opening se non uti corporum figures, sed planis
xat.
escription du fondement des nombres géométriques” is in fact the title of the section in which
n introduces his schematism [Stevin, 1625].
Fig. 3. Representation of the powers of 2 according to Stevin [from pp. 12 and 13 of his
Arithmetique 1585; reproduced in Stevin, 1955–1966, Vol. IIB, pp. 511–512].
25 On
tôn c
1609]
natur
interp
What Descartes knew in 1628 439the same manner than the simple cube is into the squares which are to be considered in
each kind. [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. III, p. 96, fol. 333v, my transl.]One could consider that these developments provide just one among many other examples
in the history of science of a powerful technique being attached to confused conceptual
grounds. Unfortunately, we have here no evidence of a powerful technique. Indeed, in the fol-
lowing passage, Descartes shows his friend evidence of his technique. But what example does
he choose? The resolution of a quadratic equation through a simple manipulation of squares,
that is to say one of the most elementary techniques in algebra, known since Al-Khwarizmi!
As one can see in Fig. 4, to solve the equation x2 = 6x + 7, Descartes constructs the
square of side x, divides the coefficient by 2 to remove two rectangles of area 3x, and thus
obtains a new square DE. In this construction, the square of side GD is subtracted twice
and one has to compensate for this by adding 9 to the whole. So if one subtracts 6x from
the sought square x2, one will obtain 7 + 9 = 16. This gives us the area of square DE (16),
and then its side DF = 4. Since DG = 3, one obtains the result AC = 7. This is the (only)
“sample” of Descartes’ technique given in 1628! And it is presented as the result of nine
years of mathematical studies in which “he has made as much progress as was possible
for a human mind”!
Then Beeckman notes, “The irrational numbers, which cannot be explained otherwise, he
explains them by a parabola (per parabolam).” This allusive statement could be a reference
to the solution of the third- and fourth-degree equations by the intersection of a parabola
and a circle, which Descartes sent to his friend four months later and which he may have
announced to him in October.25 The end of the text contains a discussion of the differente should, however, keep in mind that the Greek name for “application of area” was parabolê
horiôn. This technique, exposed in Book II of Euclid’s Elements, was presented by [Clavius,
when dealing with the extraction of square roots (Chap. XII, p. 46 sq.). As we will see, it was
ally involved in the calculus presented in the Regulae, so one should not dismiss this
retation of per parabolam too quickly.
Fig. 4. The resolution of an equation in 1628. (Beeckman, 1939–1953, III p. 96).
440 D. Rabouindenominations of the roots of an equation (“true”, “implicit” (i.e., negative), and “imagi-
nary”) and the number of them, which Descartes derives, he says, ex tabula vulgari
(fol. 333v).
By recalling the Algebrae Des Cartes specimen quoddam I want to emphasize the many
weaknesses it presents: the geometric schematism does not seem well grounded, the alge-
braic technique is trivial, and the notion of algebraic dimension is metaphorically explained
through a qualitative analogy. How are we to understand this collection of disappointing
features if Descartes at that time was already in possession of an original and powerful
technique? Was this the outcome of an “entirely new science”?26 Not that a great mathe-
matician cannot make errors, feel hesitations, or have zones of confusion in his conceptual
foundations. But we have to keep in mind that we are not dealing here with a draft that
Descartes kept for himself. What we have here is nothing less than a demonstration brought
to make clear the progress made during the nine preceding years and to convince Beeckman
to engage in a more ambitious program.
Of course, one could object that the poverty and the confusion that I have attributed to
Descartes were in fact linked to the very specific situation in which this text arose. Maybe
Descartes was simply hiding from Beeckman the real power of his technique; maybe he
adapted a powerful technique to a simple example, taking into account the low mathemat-
ical level of his interlocutor; maybe Beeckman, who was certainly not an expert algebraist,
simply did not understand what Descartes had explained to him; maybe he introduced his
own confusion into Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas, etc.
These arguments are very difficult to dismiss since they rely on the postulate that there is
something behind the extant documents, about which we have no direct evidence at all. This
is why I presented my interpretation as a methodological exercise. There are nonetheless
positive arguments that indicate that Beeckman’s mathematical weaknesses are insufficient
to justify the disappointing features presented by the sources. It should be noted first that
Descartes is truly asking Beeckman for help in the solution of a “physico-mathematical26 See for example [Sasaki, 2003, p. 166]: “What can be asserted from our examination of
Beeckman’s record ‘A certain specimen of Descartes’s Algebra’ is that before October 1628,
Descartes had already possessed his own system of algebra, which can be thought to be the product
on an ‘entirely new science.’”
What Descartes knew in 1628 441problem” and that there is no reason to suspect that he is insincere when saying that he
wants to launch a new ambitious program with him or that he is hiding something from
him. Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Descartes did not show the full extent
of his skills to his friend. It would not change the essence of our interrogations: why did
he not even mention what is supposed to be the real content of his techniques (the exponen-
tial notation, the classification of curves, the algebraic analysis of geometrical problems)?
Remember that Descartes had no difficulty in announcing his ambitious program of a “new
science” in 1619. It would be very natural to mention the outcome of this program, if there
was any. Besides, why would Descartes think that the treatment of quadratic equations is a
simple example of his techniques? Finally, it should be pointed out that Descartes had no
difficulty sending a much more complicated example (the resolution of solid problems
through the intersection of a circle and a parabola) to his friend a few months later; once
again, as we shall see below, we find no trace of the exponential algebraic notation in this
piece, nor of the classification of curves, nor of the algebraic analysis of geometrical prob-
lems. In this case, there is no reason to suspect that Beeckman made changes to Descartes’
writings, since he explicitly states that he made a faithful copy of them (quod ex illius scriptis
ad verbum describo). Last, but not least, we possess an independent source supporting our
interpretation: the same confusions on similar topics appear in the Regulae ad directionem
ingenii.
3. Dimensio, unitas, et figura: looking outside of the Specimen
3.1. The schematism of the Regulae
There is extensive literature on Descartes’ Rules for the Direction of the Mind, but stran-
gely, some passages seem to persistently escape the attention of readers. These passages pre-
cisely concern the three notions identified above: dimension, unity, and figure (dimensio,
unitas et figura), and the fact that two schematisms are proposed by Descartes — depending
on which representation one chooses for the unit. Therefore, I would like to put particular
emphasis on these aspects. In Rule XIV Descartes famously introduces the foundation of
his geometrical calculus (presented in Rule XVIII) by stating that “in all reasoning it is only
by means of comparison that we attain an exact knowledge of the truth” and that “the busi-
ness of human reason consists almost entirely in preparing this operation.” This establishes
the central role of proportion in the treatment of any “question” and the main goal of the
method in this second part of the treatise: to reduce these proportions to simple compari-
sons, that is, equalities [AT X, 440; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 57–58]. According to this gen-
eral structure, any “question” can be expressed in terms of proportions between magnitudes
and, in consequence, through some spatial representation “since no other subject [scil. than
spatial extension] displays more distinctly all the various differences in proportions.” Hence
the conclusion that “perfectly determinate problems present hardly any difficulty at all,
save that of expressing proportions in the form of equalities, and also that everything in
which we encounter just this difficulty can easily be, and ought to be, separated from every
other subject and then expressed in terms of extension and figures. Accordingly, we shall
dismiss everything else from our thoughts and deal exclusively with these until we reach
Rule twenty-five” [AT X, 441; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 58].
These ideas are taken up again by Descartes in the Discours de la méthode, when he
comments on the very first application of the Method. He starts by recalling, as in Rule
IV, that he studied the common part of mathematics, “observing that, although their
Fig. 5. How to represent the difference between white, blue, and red according to Rule XII [from
Descartes, 1701, p. 34].
442 D. Rabouinobjects are different, they do not fail to agree in this, that they take nothing under consid-
eration but the various relationships or proportions which are present in these objects, I
thought that it would be better if I only examined these proportions in their general aspect.”
He then explains the way in which he could handle these proportions:27 [A
28 OnThen, having carefully noted that in order to comprehend the proportions I should some-
times require to consider each one in particular, and sometimes merely keep them in
mind, or take them in groups, I thought that, in order the better to consider them in
detail, I should picture them in the form of lines, because I could find no method more
simple nor more capable of being distinctly represented to my imagination and senses.
I considered, however, that in order to keep them in my memory or to embrace several
at once, it would be essential that I should explain them by means of certain formulas,
the shorter the better. And for this purpose it was requisite that I should borrow all that
is best in Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one by the
other.27The main difference between the two documents is that, in the second case, the “method”
is presented in the context of an application to pure mathematics or physico-mathematica,
whereas the Regulae are concerned more with epistemological considerations (with explicit
reference to the theory of imagination exposed in Rule XII). In particular, one should
notice that the model presented in Rule XIV on the example of colors (see Fig. 5) is not
yet that of a geometrical calculus stricto sensu, but that of a schematic representation used
to code differences.28 This is clear from the beginning of Rule XII, where Descartes treats
the example of colors, which he alludes to in Rule XIV.
As I shall describe in the following paragraphs, Descartes explains in detail the epistemo-
logical grounds of his geometric schematism, expanding at large on the definition of “exten-
sion.” He then arrives at “the characteristics of extension itself which may assist us in
elucidating differences in proportion”, namely our three key notions: dimension, unity,
and figure.
Dimension, first, is defined in term of the number of parameters entering a question.
Hence a triangle can be seen as having three dimensions, since it needs three parameters
to fully determine it (the three sides, or two sides and an angle, or two angles and its area).T VI, 19–20; Descartes, 2003, p. 93].
this general project, see [Sepper, 1996, Chap. III] and [Fichant, 1998, pp. 1–28].
What Descartes knew in 1628 443In the same way, a trapezium can be seen as having five dimensions; a tetrahedron, six, etc.
The difference from the “qualitative” interpretation presented in the Specimen is that here
the notion is more clearly limited to measurable parameters: “By ‘dimension’ we mean sim-
ply a mode or aspect in respect of which some subject is considered to be measurable. Thus
length, breadth, and depth are not the only dimensions of a body: weight too is a dimension
— the dimension in terms of which objects are weighed. Speed is a dimension — the dimen-
sion of motion; and there are countless other instances of this sort” [AT X, 447; Descartes,
1985–1991, I, 62]. This is consistent with the idea that Descartes’ overall project was at that
time still close to Beeckman’s notion of a Physico-mathematica, and there is no clear dis-
tinction between the mathematical and the physical notions of dimension (what he says
being close to what we now deal with in “dimensional analysis”).
Of particular interest is the fact that Descartes then justifies the limitation to two dimen-
sions not through mathematical requisites but according to his theory of knowledge [AT X,
449; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 63]. But the most interesting development comes with the
notion of unity considered as a “common nature which all the things which we are compar-
ing must participate in equally.” Descartes goes on to say that “we may adopt as unit either
one of the magnitudes already given or any other magnitude, and this will be the common
measure of all the others.” And he then adds a significant comment: “We shall regard it as
having as many dimensions as the extreme terms which are to be compared. We shall con-
ceive of it either simply as something extended, abstracting it from everything else — in
which case it will be the same as a geometrical point (the movement of which makes up
a line, according to the geometers), or as some sort of line, or as a square” [AT X, 449–
450; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 63–64]. Notwithstanding the fact that Descartes states here
that the unit should have “as many dimensions as the extreme terms which are to be com-
pared” — an intriguing statement to which I shall return — he seems to repeat here again
the “unfortunate” error pointed out by Stevin: a unit can be conceived either as a geomet-
rical point or as a line segment or as a square. Furthermore, Descartes then justifies the dou-
ble regime of representation in the following way:As for figures, we have already shown how ideas of all things can be formed by means of
these alone. We have still to point out in this context that, of the innumerable different
species of figure, we are to use here only those which most readily express all the various
relations or proportions. There are but two kinds of things which are compared with
each other: multiplicity and magnitudes. We also have two kinds of figures which we
may use to represent these conceptually: for example, the points,
.
..
...
which represent a triangular number. . . . Figures such as these represent multiplicities;
while those which are continuous and unbroken, such as4, h etc., illustrate magnitudes.
[AT X, 450; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 64; transl. modified]At the beginning of the next Rule (XV), Descartes repeats, “If we wish to form more dis-
tinct images of these figures in our imagination with the aid of a visual display, then it is
self-evident how they should be drawn. For example, we shall depict the unit in three ways,
viz. by means of a square, h, if we think of it only as having length and breadth; by a line,
, if we regard it as having just length; or, lastly, by a point, ., if we view it as the element
which goes to make up a multiplicity” [AT X, 453; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 65–66, transl.
modified].
Fig. 6. The geometrical calculus of the Regulae (Rule XVIII), as presented in the Opuscula Posthuma
[Descartes, 1701, p. 64].
444 D. RabouinIn the Regulae, however, the schematism is not confined to a foundational role, but leads
to an operative use presented in Rule XVIII.
As one can see in Fig. 6, the calculus is now presented only with segments and rectangles.
This is certainly why many commentators did not pay much attention to the double regime
of representation presented in the preceding rules. One should also notice that this schema-
tism is quite different from the one presented to Beeckman. In the Specimen, Descartes pre-
sented what we now write as x3 as x times a “square,” a “square” being itself x times a
rectangle composed of x “unit squares.” He saw that this procedure could be accomplished
only per nudas lineas so that the square would be x times a line composed of x unit seg-
ments. This procedure can be immediately applied to the product of any given magnitude,
so that abc is c times b times a line composed of a unit segments. But this is not the path
followed in Rule XVIII. There, Descartes is much closer to the schema in use since the time
of the ancient Greeks (at least), in which one represents multiplication and division as form-
ing rectangles and taking their side.29 This discrepancy supports well the distinction
between a foundational and an operative use of the schematism. Descartes used a certain
schematism to figurate the quantities involved in a question (XIV–XV), but when it came
to computations proper, he went back to the representation of multiplication as forming29 The main difference being, of course, that Descartes is not constrained by the problem of
dimensionality and can express the product of three magnitudes abc by taking a segment equal to
the rectangle ab and use it to form a rectangle with other side c.
What Descartes knew in 1628 445rectangles (XVIII). This was, in fact, also the case in the Specimen when he solved the
quadratic equation and represented 3x as a rectangle with sides x and 3.
The preceding passages should suffice to make it clear that the weaknesses of the
Specimen were due neither to some misunderstanding or lapsus calami coming from
Beeckman, nor to an oversimplification coming from Descartes. When Descartes was
writing the Regulae, he fell into the same apparent confusions concerning the notion of
dimension, the status of the unit and the way to represent it. This then raises two important
questions, which I shall tackle in the remaining part of the paper: why did Descartes
maintain a double regime of representation, which looks at first like a useless source of
confusion? How are we to understand the compatibility between what I have called the
“foundational” and the “operative” use of the schematism?
3.2. Points and numbers
To illustrate the fact that one can use dots to represent “multiplicities”, Descartes gives
the example of “triangular numbers” and of a family tree [AT X, 450]. These examples are
very important if one wants to understand why Descartes could have been attached to this
kind of representation. If we cease to read the development of the years 1628–1629 through
the lens of his future mathematics and ask ourselves, “what kind of mathematics did Des-
cartes do before?” we see immediately that Descartes actually spent a lot of time and energy
reflecting on “figurate numbers” and on polyhedra. In fact, the only extant Cartesian mathe-
matical treatise from this period (Progymnasmata de solidorum elementis [AT X, 257–277],
which we possess in a partial copy made by Leibniz) deals precisely with these questions, as
do some important passages of the Cogitationes Privatae.30 This thus allows a simple
answer to our first question: Descartes maintained a double regime of representation simply
because it corresponded to the kind of mathematics he was doing.
In agreement with P. Costabel [Descartes, 1987], I consider the Progymnasmata to have
been conceived at the beginning of the 1620s. A number of arguments have been advanced
to support this hypothesis, although none of them are completely conclusive. The use of cossic
notation seems to indicate an early writing (but there is an important exception in a text dated
from 1638 [AT X, 297–299]). One can also add the fact that Descartes professed to Mersenne
in 1638 that he had neglected geometry for “more than fifteen years” [AT II, 99]. Since the first
part of the copy made by Leibniz deals precisely with geometry, this claim would make the
De Solidorum elementis the outcome of studies made before 1623.31 Finally, there has recently30 See [AT X, 241]: on triangular numbers; [AT X, 246–247]: on the rectangular tetrahedron; [AT X,
247–248]: on the pyramid, and [Sasaki, 2003, pp. 128–132], for an English translation and a
description of these fragments.
31 Descartes, 1987, pp. 106–109. This claim by Descartes does not preclude the fact that the treatise
could have been written later. Neither does it limit the kind of geometry that Descartes was doing in
the 1620s. In the letter to Mersenne, dated 15 April 1630, where Descartes confesses that he is now
tired of mathematics, he gives examples of other kinds of (plane) geometrical problems, which he
solved using only ruler and compass: “Invenire diametrum sphr tangentis alias quatuor
magnitudine et positione datas. Invenire axem parabol tangentis tres lineas rectas positione datas
et indefinitas, cujus etiam axis secet ad angulos rectos aliam rectam etiam positione datam et
indefinitam. Invenire stilum horologii in data mundi parte describendi, ita ut umbr extremitas, data die
anni, transeat per tria data puncta, saltem quando istud fieri potest” [AT I, 139]. It should be noted
that these problems are all plane problems and that it is interesting that Descartes brought up this
kind of example if he was already dealing with much complex ones.
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De Solidorum elementis and research by contemporary German mathematicians such as
Johannes Faulhaber, Johannes Remmelin, and Peter Roth.32 Even if one remains cautious
regarding the story (told by Lipstorp) of the encounter between Descartes and Faulhaber
in Ulm in 1620, there are, as Schneider has summarized, “a number of astounding concur-
rences in the treatment of various mathematical problems besides the solution of the general
quartic. These concern, for instance, the rule of signs for a determination of how many real
roots an equation can have, a Pythagorean theorem for three dimensions, Faulhaber’s
extension of figurate numbers to polyhedral numbers of the five regular polyhedra and the
content of Descartes’ De solidorum elementis, which contains a relation between the numbers
of corners, edges, and faces of regular polyhedra” [Schneider, 2008, p. 53].
To this set of converging arguments, I shall add another one. In the Discours, as we have
seen, Descartes presents the first outcome of his method as a study of mathematics, more
specifically of its unifying part (“ratios and proportions”). Then he adds,32 Se
2006]As a matter of fact, I can venture to say that the exact observation of the few precepts
which I had chosen gave me so much facility in sifting out all the questions embraced in
these two sciences [scil. Algebra and geometrical analysis], that in the two or three months
which I employed in examining them — commencing with the most simple and general,
and making each truth that I discovered a rule for helping me to find others — not only
did I arrive at the solution of many questions which I had hitherto regarded as most dif-
ficult, but, towards the end, it seemed to me that I was able to determine in the case of
those of which I was still ignorant, by what means, and in how far, it was possible to
solve them. [AT VI, 21; Descartes, 2003, p. 93]According to this story, Descartes obtained the first results of his methodological inves-
tigations in algebra and geometry as early as 1620. However, one should be cautious when
evaluating this declaration, since Descartes wrote it more than 15 years after the event. In
any case, we would have to explain how it is that Descartes was convinced in 1628 that
“insofar as arithmetic and geometry were concerned, he had nothing more to discover.”
In what kind of “Geometry” and “Arithmetic” did Descartes obtain his results? As I have
tried to argue in the preceding section, the many weaknesses of the contents of the Specimen
and of the Regulae should convince us that there is not necessarily a “hidden” technique to
uncover under this declaration. My hypothesis is that it most likely refers to works such as
the Progymnasmata, which present the advantage of being compatible with the weaknesses
remaining in the texts of 1628. The De solidorum elementis would indeed fit perfectly into
Descartes’ description in the Discours, not only because they contain some new and inter-
esting results in geometry (including an algebraic demonstration of the fact that there are
only five regular polyhedra — which was considered by many people at that time as the
culmination of Euclid’s Elements), but also because the study of “figurate numbers” was
an important part of algebra in the German tradition.
3.3. Calculating with points
I will limit my study of the Progymnasmata to aspects of particular interest to us. The
copy made by Leibniz does not contain any diagrammatic representation of figurate num-e the studies by [Schneider, 1993 and 2008; Mehl, 2001; Penchèvre, 2004; Manders, 1995 and
.
What Descartes knew in 1628 447bers through dots, but this representation is implied by their definition and by the very aim
of the second part of the text: to calculate the “weights” (i.e., the number of vertices) of
polyhedral numbers.33 These weights, which Descartes denotes by O, can be obtained by
counting the number of polygonal faces opposite the solid angle chosen as origin (F),
the number of edges (R, for “radix”), and the number of vertices (A, for “angles”). Using
the formula for the gnomon, F  R + A, the total weight O can then be calculated [Des-
cartes, 1987, pp. 38–39].
As one can see, this exercise is mainly a matter of counting, as is the first part of the text
copied by Leibniz, which deals with solid geometry and which contains (although not in the
modern “Euler formula” form) the famous relationship between the number of faces, edges,
and solid angles for regular polyhedra. It thus corresponds to the part of the mathesis that
Descartes ascribed to the consideration of “order” in the Regulae.34 These enumerations are
conducted by recourse to a representation in which (polygonal) surfaces are reduced to
more basic figures (triangles) composed of lines, the extremities of which are the different
pondera. Hence they satisfy the requirement that proportion (we shall see that the term is
used by Descartes in the text) be studied through the consideration of decomposition into
“simple lines,” the extremities of which are points — even if in a meaning quite different
from that of the “calcul géométrique.” They also satisfy the requirement that these compu-
tations, when involving complex configurations, be treated with the help of algebraic for-
mulas (written at that time in cossic notation).
At the beginning of the passage on polyhedral numbers, for example, Descartes begins by
recalling how one can obtain the weight of any polygonal number by decomposing it into
triangles. He gives the example of the tretragonal weight, the number of which can be cal-
culated as twice the number of triangular numbers minus the number of edges in com-
mon.35 He then gives the general formula for regular polyhedral numbers in a similar
mixed form of cossic notation and rhetorical discourse involving a description of the spatial33 The first line of the second part of the text copied by Leibniz makes direct reference to this kind of
representation: “Omnium optime formabuntur solida per gnomones superadditos uno semper angulo
vacuo existente, ac deinde totam figuram resolvi posse in triangula” [AT X, 269].
34 To those who object that “order and measure” should be interpreted in a much broader meaning,
grounding a technique which culminated in the “calcul géométrique” of 1637 or referring to the
methodical “order,” I refer to a letter of Descartes to Ciermans, which has not yet received enough
attention from Cartesian scholars. Perceiving the generality of the technique involved in
La Géométrie, Ciermans proposed to call it a mathesis pura rather than a “geometry.” Descartes
responded negatively to this proposition by saying: “for I did explain in this treatise not one
question pertaining properly to Arithmetic, nor even one of those concerned with order and
measure, as did Diophantus; but, moreover, I didn’t deal in it with movement, even if pure
mathematics, at least the one which I have at most cultivated, has it for its principal object”
[AT II, 70–71: my emphasis]. Note also the mysterious claim according to which the “principal
object” of pure mathematics is in 1638 movement. On this aspect see [De Buzon, 1996] and
[Domski, 2009].
35 “12 +
1
2 per 2 fit
2
2 +
2
2 unde sublato 1 fit 1 ” [Descartes, 1987, p. 4]. As one can see, the text
uses the astrological symbol for the unknown, a modification that is thought to come from
Leibniz. The general formula for polygonal numbers was already given by Roth, as were the ones for
pyramidal numbers, which is used by Descartes in the last part of the passage without explanation
[Schneider, 2008, p. 10].
448 D. Rabouinconfiguration of these numbers.36 His main goal here seems to be to extend these results,
already obtained by Faulhaber and Roth at the beginning of the century to semiregular
polyhedra, which he does in the last part of the text — the results of these different steps
being collected into several tables.
This kind of practice fits very well into the idea that an important part of mathematics
deals with the consideration of order and that these computations can be performed with
the help of schematic spatial representations using points, lines, and figures (the basic figure
here being not the rectangle or the square, but the triangle). Moreover, in the De solidorum
elementis, “order” is contrasted with “measure”, in accordance with what was written in the
Regulae. This development reminds us very much of those we have already encountered
concerning the notion of dimension in the Specimen and in the Regulae:36 “T
the fa
differ
radic
37 No
ejusd
a ver
texts
usual
in th
consiWhen we will imagine these same figures as measurable, then all the units will be under-
stood as being of the same ratio as the figures themselves. For example, triangles [are
measured by] triangular units; pentagons are measured by a pentagonal unit, etc. Then
the proportion between a plane [figure] and its radix would be the same as that between
a square and its radix; and for a solid, [it will be] the same as that of a cube [to its radix]:
for example, if the radix is 3, the plane will be 9, the solid 27, etc. This holds also for the
circle and the sphere, and all other figures. If the circumference of a circle is three times
larger than another, its area will be nine times larger. From which it is observed that the
progressions involved in our mathesis, , , etc. are not tied to linear, square or cubic
figures, but designated in a general way through these diverse kind of measure. [My
translation of Descartes, 1987, pp. 4–5]Even if this development is very intricate, the parallel with the Regulae seems no less
striking: the first sentence repeats the idea (on the same examples of the triangle and the
pentagon) that the notion of dimension can be seen as the number of parameters of the
problem (in this case the linear dimension of the given figure).37 This passage also echoes
the fact that the unit should have “as many dimensions as the extreme terms which are
to be compared” [AT X, 450]. Furthermore, we now have a way to understand the apparent
contradiction between this last qualification and the identification of units with “points”: it
amounts to the difference between the consideration of order (counting the number of
pondera, in which case the unit is a point) and of measure (measuring areas and volume,
in which case the unit needs to have as many dimensions as the surface being considered).
In the margin, Leibniz draws a picture (Fig. 7) that makes it easier to grasp what Descartes
has in mind [Descartes, 1987, p. 39].
The last sentence of the above quotation expresses the fact that already at the time of the
De solidorum elementis, Descartes had arrived at the idea, once again in perfect accordancehe algebraic expressions for these figurate numbers are found by multiplying the exponents of
ce plus 12 by
1
3 +
1
3, and then by the number of faces, which is done as many times as there are
ent types of faces in the given body; then add to or subtract from the result the number of
es multiplied by 12 +
1
2 , and the number of angles multiplied by ” [Descartes, 1982, p. 108].
te that Descartes designates the identity of dimension by the expression “the same ratio”
em rationis, and that he also talks of the “proportion” between the plane figure and its “side” —
y interesting choice of terminology if one wants to understand what he has in mind in other
when talking about “ratio and proportion” and that might well be much broader that what is
ly thought. This passage can be compared with the beginning of the development on dimensio
e Regulae, in which it is defined as “modum et rationem, secundum quam aliquod subjectum
deratur esse mensurabile” [AT X, 447, my emphasis].
Fig. 7. In the margin, Leibniz draws a triangle and a pentagon, whose side is three units and whose
area is nine units [from a facsimile of the Hanover manuscript, Descartes, 1987].
What Descartes knew in 1628 449with the Regulae, that algebraic powers should not be interpreted in terms of a certain fixed
geometrical representation, but in terms of proportions entering into a certain relation (in
this case that of measure). This gives a very nice context for understanding how Descartes
could at the same time have such clear ideas about the fact that algebraic degrees should
not be confused with geometric dimensions and nonetheless be apparently so unclear when
expressing the notion of dimension in and of itself.
Even if there is no reason to conflate mathesis and mathesis universalis, the expression
“the progressions involved in our mathesis” (“has progressiones notrae matheseos”) is also
very striking. It indicates that Descartes thought that he had already elaborated a proper
mathesis in which the algebraic progressions played a central role — but independently of
the exponential notation. It will not be necessary to insist on the fact that this merging
of algebra and geometry then had a meaning totally different from the one it would later
acquire. The reader should keep this in mind when reading Descartes’ claims that, in his
first mathematical studies at the beginning of the 1620s, he did “borrow all that is best
in Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct the errors of the one by the other.”
In addition, the comparison between the Progymnasmata and the Regulae gives meaning
to other intriguing passages in the latter, which reinforces the impression of proximity
between the two texts. For example, in Rule X, Descartes states that: “In order to acquire
discernment we should exercise our intelligence by investigating what others have already
discovered, and methodically survey even the most insignificant products of human skill,
especially those which display or presuppose order” (my emphasis). This text is therefore a
privileged one in understanding what ordo meant for Descartes. Yet here are the examples
given:[one] must first tackle the simplest and least exalted arts, and especially those in which
order prevails — such as weaving and carpet-making, or the more feminine arts of
embroidery, in which threads are interwoven in an infinitely varied pattern. Number-
games and any games involving arithmetic, and the like, belong here. (. . .) For, since noth-
ing in these activities remains hidden and they are totally adapted to human cognitive
capacities, they present us in the most distinct way with innumerable instances of order,
38 Th
into a
cossis
450 D. Rabouineach one different from the other, yet all regular. Human discernment consists almost
entirely in the proper observance of such order. [AT X, 403–404; Descartes, 1985–
1991, I, 34–35: my emphasis]So at that time Descartes held an opinion regarding “Number-games and any games
involving arithmetic” (compared with weaving, carpet-making, and embroidery) quite dif-
ferent to the one he held later when he mocked mathematicians who wasted their time with
such useless matters [AT II, 91, to Mersenne, 31 March 1638]. In the next passage in the text
he even gives the example of cryptography, an essential feature of the “number games” that
German Rechenmeister were playing in their “algebra” (Wortrechnung).38
I am not claiming, of course, that the De solidorum elementis provide the one and only key
to reading the Regulae. However, it is certainly of interest if one wants to understand some of
its aspects and it should be noted that the comparison has not previously been made by Carte-
sian scholars. It has the tremendous advantage of relying on documents that are at the same
time both extant and compatible with the mathematical weaknesses contained in the Speci-
men. If one follows this direction, how are we then to answer our second question?
3.4. Calculating with segments
As I emphasized in previous sections, Descartes had two different uses of geometrical
schemas, which I have called “foundational” and “operative”. This designation is not
totally accurate since, as we have seen in the study of the De solidorum elementis, the “foun-
dational” use is not solely a matter of justification, but can also support various kinds of
computation. My point is that, even in this case, the figuration does not represent the com-
putation in and of itself. Neither in the Progymnasmata, nor in the Specimen, nor in Beeck-
man’s Journal, nor even in Rule XIV of the Regulae do we find examples of the second use
strictly speaking. The schematism is merely an aid to solving certain problems, and this aid
can take various forms, including the use of dots and of basic figures other than squares and
rectangles (typically triangles, into which polygons can be decomposed). What I have called
the “operative” use seems to appear only in Rule XVIII, in which Descartes tries to repre-
sent the basic operations between magnitudes in general. This coincides, however, with the
sudden disappearance of points. How are we to understand this?
As should be clear now, my understanding is that Descartes is turning to another aspect
of his project with Rule XVIII. But to distinguish these two aspects would not solve our
main difficulty, that of the apparent incompatibility between them. It does not seem possible
to consider dots as represented by the extremities of segments without losing the very effi-
ciency of the calculus (just think what happens to the extremities when two segments are
added). More generally — as pointed out by Stevin — the interpretation of units by points
contradicts the very idea that an algebraic equation is a transcription of a series of magni-
tudes in continuous proportion.
It is possible that what we face here is a mere contradiction. The Regulae is an unfinished
treatise and it stops abruptly precisely after the exposition of the calculus in Rule XVIII, the
remaining Rules (until XXI) subsisting only through their planned titles. It is not totally
implausible that Descartes was not satisfied with this sketch, or that he saw that he wasere is also an interesting reference in Rule VII to the game consisting of transforming its name
n anagram [AT X, 391, 18]. This game played an important role in the fight between German
ts; see [Mehl, 2001, pp. 192–204].
Fig. 8. A rectangle with a point in it? [Descartes, 1701, p. 57].
What Descartes knew in 1628 451not taking it in the right direction. I do not think, however, that this type of explanation is
totally satisfying, precisely because it leaves us with such a crude contradiction in Descartes’
thought as the one mocked by Stevin. One should at least try to see if another interpretation
is possible. And it turns out that it is. It rests, however, on a very small detail, which could
easily escape our attention.
Recall that Descartes proposed in Rule XV to represent the unit in three ways: as a
square, as a line, or as a point. When one considers two magnitudes at a time, they can
be represented as a rectangle composed of unit squares or as a lattice of points, if they
are commensurable, or as an indecomposable rectangle, if they are incommensurable. When
we deal with only one of these magnitudes, we can picture it either as a line or a series of
dots, or as a rectangle. In this last case, one has just to take a rectangle whose side is the
given magnitude and the other the unit. But in the picture reproduced in the Opuscula
(see Fig. 8), the rectangle contains. . . a point • .
We have no way of knowing if this representation was Descartes’ original one, or a sug-
gestion of the copyist, or even a misprint. But since it offers an alternative proposition to
the (disastrous) one consisting of interpreting dots as extremities of line segments, it should
attract our interest. The passage is very intricate, but one thing at least seems to be clear:
Descartes is fully aware of the fact that the representation through dots and that through
continuous magnitudes are not isomorphic. He divides the representation through rectan-
gles into two cases according to whether or not we can divide the rectangle into unit cells. In
the case of two incommensurable magnitudes, it is not possible to find a unit square into
which their “rectangle” can be decomposed (since, by definition, there is no common mea-
sure into which they can both be decomposed). The representation by dots is therefore seen
as a subclass of the more general one through rectangles (and not an equivalent one, which
would make us fall within Stevin’s critique).
The nature of the relationship between the two representations is not clear: on the one
hand, Descartes insists on the fact that there are two different kinds of schematism depend-
ing on whether or not we are dealing with multitudines; on the other hand, he proposes a
single schematism based on segments and rectangles without making clear whether one
has to interpret it in different ways depending on the objects under consideration, or if it
is one among two different representations. But we have no reason to try to reduce this dif-
ficulty, which is inherent to the tension between the foundational and the operative use of
the schematism. What I want to emphasize is that there is, in any case, a way to escape Ste-
vin’s critique and maintain the use of dots as “units.”
Here we should also recall the proposition made to Beeckman in the Specimen. When intro-
ducing his schematism through unit squares and adding ita etiam punctum, Descartes did not
develop a parallel representation through dots, but “by lines” involving “point, line, square
and cube.” We understand now how this very strange claim could nonetheless remain in
accordance with the idea that algebraic powers are magnitudes in continuous proportion.
We just have to represent points “inside” our rectangle to render it consistent (see Fig. 9).
There is, however, a price to pay for this solution, since we now lose the close connection
with the computation on dots (as extremities of lines) presented in the De solidorum elemen-
Fig. 9. Punctum, lineam, quadratum, cubum. Diagram adapted from a figure of the facsimile of fol.
333 of Beeckman’s autograph published in (Beeckman, 1939–1953, III).
452 D. Rabouintis. My overall impression is that these two representations originate from two different
lines of thought, which do not match where they overlap.
3.5. The limitation of the geometrical calculus
As an indication of the fact that the representation of the calculus presented in Rule XVIII
is a sketch, which could correspond to a new line of thought for Descartes, I shall stress its
limitations. They appear clearly in the question of mean proportionals, at which point the
extant part of the treatise abruptly stops. The first remark we should make in this regard is
that Descartes, at the time of the composition of the Regulae, isolated four basic operations,
not five, as was usual at that time and as he would do in La Géométrie. This is due to the fact
that root extraction is not seen as a basic operation but as a special case of division:39 Th
crucia
meth
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way.
opera
have
equat
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whichAs for those divisions in which the divisor is not given but only indicated by some rela-
tion, as when we are required to extract the square root or the cube root etc., in these
cases we must note that the term to be divided, and all the other terms, are always to
be conceived as lines which form a series of continued proportionals, the first member
of which is the unit, and the last the magnitude to be divided. We shall explain in due
course how to find any number of mean proportionals between the latter two magni-
tudes. [AT X, 467; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 75]The last sentence is very striking. It means that at that time Descartes thought that he had a
general procedure to insert any number of mean proportionals between two given magni-
tudes. It could be a reference to his famous proportional compasses discovered in 1619, which
do precisely this job. This has to remain a conjecture, since the last part of the treatise in which
Descartes was supposed to present this general procedure is not extant (lost or never writ-
ten).39 In any case, Descartes has to explain first how to perform this operation in the simple
case of one mean proportional, an operation equivalent to the extraction of the square root.e last Rules of the second part, of which we just have the titles, give us no clue about this
l issue. They just say that one must reduce any problem to an equation (XIX: “Using this
od of reasoning, we must try to find as many magnitudes, expressed in two different ways, as
are unknown terms, which we treat as known in order to work out the problem in the direct
That will give us as many comparisons between two equal terms”), and then carry out the
tions (XX: “Once we have found the equations, we must carry out the operations which we
left aside, never using multiplication when division is in order”) and try to reduce a system of
ions to a single one (XXI: “If there are many equations of this sort, they should all be reduced
single one, viz. to the equation whose terms occupy fewer places in the series of magnitudes
are in continued proportion, i.e. the series in which the order of the terms is to be arranged”).
Fig. 10. Definition of the gnomon and the complements at the beginning of Euclid’s Elements II [in
Clavius, 1611–1612, Vol. 1, p. 83]. Just after this definition, Clavius presents the general procedure of
Book II as the foundation of the rules of algebra.
What Descartes knew in 1628 453As we have seen, a key feature of Descartes’ calculus in the Regulae is that one works on
segments and on rectangles at the same time. This implies that one is able to transform any
rectangle into a line and vice versa. Since we already know how to represent any line by a
rectangle (whose sides are the given line and a unit), what we need is a general procedure to
transform a given rectangle into another one. This is the general problem on which the
Regulae abruptly stops:It is therefore important to explain here how every rectangle can be transformed into a line,
and conversely how a line or even a rectangle can be transformed into another rectangle,
one side of which is specified. Geometers can do this very easily, provided they recognize
that in comparing lines with some rectangle (as we are now doing), we always conceive
the lines as rectangles, one side of which is the length which we adopted as our unit. In this
way, the entire business is reduced to the following problem: given a rectangle, to construct
upon a given side another rectangle equal to it. The merest beginner in geometry is of course
perfectly familiar with this; nevertheless I want to make the point, in case it should seem
that I have omitted something. [AT X, 468; Descartes, 1985–1991, I, 76]The rest is missing.
“The merest beginner in geometry” would certainly know how to proceed in this case,
since it involves one of the basic procedures explained in Book II of Euclid’s Elements
and known as “application of areas.” The list of identities exposed in Book II is indeed
based on the fact that the “gnomon” constructed around the diagonal of a rectangle com-
prises two equivalent rectangles called by Euclid the “complements” (see Fig. 10).
It is therefore easy to use this property and construct a rectangle equivalent to another
one, for example, a “line” c (i.e., “line-rectangle”) equivalent to a “product” ab [Bos, 2009,
see Fig. 11].
But our “merest beginner” would also know that there is a particular case in which this
operation is not so easy to perform: when one of the sought-for rectangles is a square. In this
case, which is equivalent to the insertion of a mean proportional, one needs, as Euclid
explained in the last proposition of Book II (II, 14: “to construct a square equivalent to a given
figure”), the help of an auxiliary circle. But neither in the schematism presented in the Regulae,
nor in the one presented to Beeckman in 1628, is there any mention of a circle. In contrast, the
Géométrie would not only propose another schema for the basic operations on “simple lines,”
Fig. 11. How to construct a “line-rectangle,” whose side c is equal to the product ab, u being the
unit.
454 D. Rabouinbut also would introduce a fifth basic operation, the extraction of a square root, which would
be represented, in the traditional Euclidean way, by resorting to a semicircle.
This discrepancy fits very well into the general context which I have tried to reconstruct
above. Indeed, the representation of the extraction of square roots by a circle, which was
very well known as a geometric procedure, does not have an immediate correspondent in
the representation of computation on multitudines. Thus it is no particular surprise that
Descartes simply “forgot” to include the circle as a basic element of his schematism in
1628. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Clavius used “application of area” in the part of
his Algebra dedicated to the extraction of roots, but did so without resorting to the circle
as shown in Fig. 12. This was because Clavius’s goal was not constructing the square root,
but determining its value. He could therefore proceed by first drawing the sought-for square
and then determining the value of its side by using a gnomon property (in a way that is very
close to the kind of technique that Descartes presented to Beeckman in his Specimen).
If this interpretation is right, it would have another important consequence for the study
of Cartesian mathematical texts of the late 1620s. It would mean that the inclusion of the
solutions of the third- and fourth-degree equations and of the Specimen into the same
group of documents is far from obvious — the reason being that the first one was done
through the intersection of a parabola and a circle.3.6. Per parabolam
In February 1629, Beeckman transcribed in his Journal the content of new documents
which he had received from Descartes, presumably after he himself had sent his demonstra-
tion of the fact that the hyperbola was an anaclastic curve. These documents comprise first,
after Beeckman’s demonstration, a solution to the problem of the insertion of two mean
Fig. 12. Extraction of square root in Clavius [1609, Chap. XIII, p. 52]. One first constructs the
square ABHI and then determines the value of its side.
What Descartes knew in 1628 455proportionals. This solution, which was achieved through the intersection of a circle and a
parabola, was demonstrated geometrically by a “Parisian mathematician” (presumably
Mydorge) after Descartes discovered its construction.40 The second text presents a general
method for constructing all solid problems — a “universal secret” to solve equations
involving three and four dimensions.41 We know from other documents that Descartes40 [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. IV, p. 156]. Cum D. des Chartes invenisset per parabolam duo media
proportionalia inveniri, hoc mathematicus quidam Galus Parisiis geometrice demonstravit hoc modo.
Beeckman then adds: quod ad verbum descripsi.
41 Auxilio parabolae omnia solida problemata generali methodo construere. Quod alio loco vocat
D. Des Chartes secretum universale ad aequationes omnes tertia vel quarta dimensione involutas lineis
geometricis exponendas [Beeckman, 1939–1953, Vol. IV, pp. 138–139]. Once again Beeckman writes,
Quod ex illius scriptis ad verbum describo. Remember that Descartes promised in 1628 to send
Beeckman his Parisian Algebra. A passage from the letter of 1630 would indicate that he did so
(Scribis enim Algebram, quam tibi dedi, meam amplius non esse [AT I, 159]). It could then be thought
that the solution of the third degree equation was part of this package. On the other hand, Descartes
states in the letter dated 25 January 1638 to Mersenne that nobody has a copy of his Algebra [AT I,
501]. If this is true, it would mean that he just sent Beeckman an excerpt of it, perhaps his resolution
of the “solid problem,” as is suggested by the fact that his construction is presented just after the
demonstration by “a certain French mathematician.”
456 D. Rabouindiscovered his solution of the insertion of two mean proportionals in around 1625 [Bos,
2001, p. 255; Serfati, 2002, pp. 72–75]. We do not know, however, how he discovered the
generalization to the solution of any equation of degree 3 or 4 — for which, once again,
he just gives the construction. Neither do we know if the “general” solution was discovered
before, after, or at the same time as the particular one.
Henk Bos has proposed an elegant reconstruction of the demonstration of the general-
ization using the method of “indeterminate coefficients” [Bos, 2001, p. 257]. By just writing
the general equation of a circle and using the fact that the points should also lie on a para-
bola, one immediately obtains a fourth-degree equation in one variable expressed only in
terms of the coordinates of the center of the circle. By then identifying these coefficients
with that of a general equation of degree 4, one obtains the different magnitudes involved
in Descartes’ construction. The method of “indeterminate coefficients” was known and
used by cossist algebraists, but in an arithmetical context. By using it in a geometrical con-
text in which curves are represented and manipulated through their equations, Descartes
would have made his first step in what would be the core of La Géométrie’s new technique.
In fact, most commentators, when confronted with the text of 1629, simply replace it by
that of La Géométrie, in which the third part is dedicated to the solution of solid problem.42
If these reconstructions are correct, Descartes was certainly doing algebraic analysis in
1628–1629. But unless new elements are brought into the debate, it would remain based
on a petitio principii (if Descartes was doing algebraic analysis, the reconstructions could
be correct, and if they are, Descartes was doing algebraic analysis). As confessed by Bos,
“it may be that Descartes arrived at the general construction by the method of indetermi-
nate coefficients. The proof which I have added above shows that such a technique leads
directly to the construction. Moreover, in his notes to the 1659 Latin edition of the Geo-
metry Van Schooten added a derivation of the construction by indeterminate coefficients.
However, it may also be that Descartes found the general solution by successive generaliza-
tion of his construction of two mean proportionals” [Bos, 2001, p. 258].
For my part, I would like to insist once again on the actual content of the text. One
should first note that this development is entitled (maybe by Beeckman) Parabolâ aequati-
ones cossicas lineis exponere. As we have seen, Descartes does seem to have still been using
cossic notation at the time. The matter is one of importance, since many reconstructions
would not fit with this situation. For example, it is not easy to express the general equation
of a circle using cossist symbols.43 The argument could, however, seem to be of little value,
since in fact Beeckman’s transcription does not use symbolic notation at all. But the fact
that the text, which is supposed to be transcribed ad verbum, is purely rhetorical should
be, in and of itself, very interesting. In Descartes’ description, the coefficients of the general
equation of fourth degree are described not by letters but by expressions such as “the num-
ber of squares,” “the number of roots,” and “the absolute number,” in the same way as they
were described, for example, in Clavius [1609].42 See for example [Serfati, 2002, pp. 95–104]. According to Serfati, Beeckman “s’est contenté de
transcrire dans son langage cossique archaïque, sans pouvoir véritablement comprendre ni l’intérêt
authentique de la découverte cartésienne, ni surtout le système symbolique mathématique employé
par son ami qui le lui exposait” (p. 101).
43 Not easy, but not impossible considering the elements given in [Manders, 2006]. In Faulhaber’s
notation, it was possible to introduce a second variable and to deal with indeterminate quantities —
even if, to my knowledge, he did not do both at the same time.
What Descartes knew in 1628 457But the main argument against this type of reconstruction is that it assumes that
Descartes, in 1628–1629, was studying curves through their equations. This claim is
immediately problematic with regard to the circle, since Descartes does not use this
equation even in later works, instead relying on the Pythagorean theorem [see Galuzzi
and Rovelli, forthcoming, Chap. 2.6]. With regard to the parabola, one has to keep in mind
that Descartes also sent Beeckman in 1628 some texts concerning conic sections, a topic he
had studied in the course of his works of optics (see Note 10). The main document concerns
ovals, which Descartes studied in an algebraic way in a fragment preserved in the Excerpta
mathematica [AT X, pp. 310–324] and in which he developed his first attempt at what would
later be known as the “method of normals” [Maronne, in this issue]. In this context, it is
very striking that the documents preserved by Beeckman present a purely geometrical
analysis with no use of algebraic techniques at all.
Finally, one should take into account the fact that the general context of this demon-
stration is not the study of curves, but the theory of equations and more specifically of
their “construction.”44 To reiterate the point made earlier: to argue that, with respect
to the teleology leading towards the “calcul géométrique” of 1637 (i.e., the algebraic
analysis of curves), Descartes did not reach the achievements usually ascribed to him, does
not amount to saying that he was ipso facto a lesser mathematician. With regard to his
Algebra, in particular, the document sent to Beeckman shows that Descartes was already
well advanced in many aspects of the subject (the study of a “general equation”; the
reduction of degree; the use of factorization, which seems necessary in any case to obtain
the magnitudes entering into his construction). The attention brought by scholars to the
German cossists active at the beginning of the 17th century has shown how far their
algebraic skills were developed, and how close their work is to what can be found in
the theory of equations provided by Descartes in the third book of La Géométrie
[Manders, 2006].45 It is hence plausible that Descartes was already well advanced in these
techniques at the beginning of 1620, and the documents that we have studied do not
contradict this hypothesis.
But, following the arguments given in the preceding sections, there are no cogent reasons
for thinking that the Specimen was part of the same project (i.e., the Algebra, dealing with
the general theory of equations and their construction) and that all of these elements were
pasted together in a coherent enterprise. On the contrary, these arguments show that there
are cogent reasons to think that they are not. This would confirm Bos’s judgement that the
Pappus problem, studied at the end of 1631 on Golius’ suggestion, was for Descartes “the
crucial catalyst; it provided him, in 1632, with a new ordered vision of the realm of geometry
and it shaped his convictions about the structure and the proper methods of geometry”
[Bos, 2001, p. 283: my emphasis]. In my opinion, it is at this moment that Descartes went
back to his 1619 project (on the classification of geometrical problems in analogy with
arithmetical ones) and merged it with that of the Regulae (to treat all problems as equations
and to use a geometrical calculus to solve them).44 On this theory, see [Bos, 1984].
45 One should also keep in mind that when Mersenne asked Descartes to send his “old algebra” to
Mydorge, he replied that he would find a much better version of it in the third part of La Géométrie
[AT I, 501].
458 D. Rabouin4. Conclusion
The line of interpretation I have presented offers to my mind three important advanta-
ges: first, it relies, as far as is possible, on contemporary documents without projecting onto
them a hidden practice for which we have no evidence, direct or indirect; second, it gives
meaning to many texts which remain in the retrospective view mysterious; finally, it allows
us to put these texts into a coherent narrative without jumping too quickly to the diagnosis
of crude contradictions in Descartes’ thought.
On the other hand, as I have tried to show, to say that Descartes was not well advanced in
1628 with regard to the teleology leading to the Géométrie does not amount to saying he was
a bad mathematician, persuaded that confused ideas and poor technique could ground a
grandiose reform of “all human knowledge.” The De solidorum elementis provides impres-
sive results for a young man who had not received a very advanced mathematical education,
even if they appear in a context which is not the one we would recognize as the “modern”
(“Cartesian”!) one. These results were, without doubt, a way of borrowing “all that is best in
Geometrical Analysis and Algebra, and correct[ing] the errors of the one by the other.”Acknowledgments
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